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Surrogacy and Silence: Why State Legislatures Should Attempt to Regulate Surrogacy Contracts 
 
Melissa A. Cartine  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2011, television personalities and married couple, Giuliana and Bill Rancic, revealed 
their struggle to have a child on their television show “Giuliana and Bill.”1  The couple had 
struggled for several years to get pregnant through in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), which is one 
method of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”).2  In 2012, Giuliana was diagnosed with 
breast cancer and although treatment was successful for her cancer, she would not be able to 
conceive on her own due to cancer treatments.
3
  As the couple desperately wanted to be parents, 
they opted for another form of ART, surrogacy.
4
  Genetically, Giuliana is the mother of the 
resulting child.
5
  Her eggs were combined with her husband’s sperm to form an embryo that was 
implanted into the surrogate.
6
  This type of surrogacy is called gestational surrogacy.
7
 
 The surrogacy process was successful for Giuliana and Bill as they now have a healthy, 
thriving baby boy.
8
  While the couple’s story appears inspiring, the process can be riddled with 
legal complexity due to a lack of statutory regulation.  In the United States, a majority of state 
legislatures have remained silent as to the legality of surrogacy contracts and as to the question 
                                                        
1
 Natalie Finn, Giuliana and Bill Rancic Welcome a Baby Boy, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/338760/giuliana-and-bill-rancic-welcome-a-baby-boy. 
2
 Id.  
3
 Id.   
4
 Id.  
5
 Id.  
6
 Id.   
7
 Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male 
Parent in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18 J.L. & Gender 199, 203 (2011).   
8
 Natalie Finn, Giuliana and Bill Rancic Welcome a Baby Boy, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/338760/giuliana-and-bill-rancic-welcome-a-baby-boy. 
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of parental rights when such contracts are signed.
9
  The failure of state legislatures to regulate in 
this area leaves parties without guidance and can ultimately harm well-meaning parents and 
innocent children.
10
 
 Several state courts have developed tests to determine parental rights when surrogacy 
contracts have been entered into because the state legislatures were silent on the issue.  New 
Jersey state courts have banned surrogacy contracts as a matter of public policy.
11
  California has 
consistently used an intent-based test, which considers the intending parents that initiated the 
surrogacy process, to be the legal the parents.
12
  Alternatively, Ohio departed from an intent-
based test and adopted a genetic-based test, which considers the genetic link between the parent 
and the child to be the dispositive factor in deciphering parental rights.
13
  A few states have 
attempted to regulate surrogacy contracts, either by banning them or taking a selective approach 
in regards to what types of surrogacy contracts the state will render enforceable.
14
  
 While the lack of regulation of surrogacy contracts does not pose a problem in 
unremarkable cases, such legislative silence can have devastating results for some families.  If 
the surrogacy process goes awry, the parties that entered in to a surrogacy agreement could spend 
years litigating over whom the child’s legal parents are.15  As evidenced by the various tests state 
courts have adopted, there is not much uniformity from state to state regarding surrogacy.  The 
unpredictability of what a particular state court might decide makes surrogacy a precarious 
                                                        
9
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, 45 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 415, 421-22 (2012). 
10
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 421-22. 
11
 In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (New Jersey 1988). 
12
 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).   
13
 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ohio 1994). 
14
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 421-22.   
15
 Id. at 422. 
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method of ART for those in states where no statutory guidance or case law is provided.
16
  To 
address this problem, this article will argue that state legislatures should regulate gestational 
surrogacy contracts, including third party gestational arrangements, due to the fact that this 
method has seen expansive growth over the last decade and because at least one intending parent 
is genetically-linked to the child.  In addition to regulating gestational surrogacy contracts, this 
article will also advocate for legislation that promotes the integrity of the surrogacy process by 
drafting laws that allow for judicial and welfare agency intervention and laws that will protect 
the surrogate.   
 This analysis accomplishes this examination in four parts.  Part I will serve as an 
introduction to the major legal pitfall of surrogacy contracts, which is a lack of statutory 
regulation of such contracts.  Part II will provide an overview of gestational and traditional 
surrogacy.  It will also describe the status quo of surrogacy among the states, which is defined as 
a hodgepodge of states that have no statutory regulation or case law at all, states with case law on 
point, and the minority of states that have attempted statutory regulation.  Part III will discuss 
why comprehensive statutory guidance, particularly in regards to gestational surrogacy, will 
provide for more predictability in the surrogacy process.  Then, it will highlight constitutional 
issues raised in surrogacy regulation and advocate for a balance between promoting integrity in 
the surrogacy process and protecting one’s right to procreate. Part III will also acknowledge that 
some issues involving surrogacy are so legally complex that they may be better addressed 
through the court system.  Finally, Part IV will restate the stance that state legislatures should 
regulate gestational surrogacy contracts so that parties entering in to such agreements can predict 
                                                        
16
 Id.  
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their legal rights at the outset.  It will also reiterate which types of regulations may help to 
promote integrity in the surrogacy process.  
II. THE STATUS QUO OF SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  GESTATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL SURROGACY  
 Generally, those seeking to start a family unit have three options: natural conception, 
adoption, and surrogacy.  Since natural conception may not be an option for many seeking to 
start a family, they must revert to the latter two options.  Adoption is highly regulated by statute 
in all states.
17
  It is also a lengthy, expensive process and the demand of those wishing to start a 
family may be greater than the availability of children that could be adopted.
18
  Surrogacy, on the 
other hand, does not need to be a process much lengthier than natural reproduction.
19
  Even more 
enticing is the fact that if an individual or family opts for gestational surrogacy and utilizes its 
own gametes, it has a genetic link with the child, making it the closet option to natural 
conception.
20
  Thus, it is easy to fathom why so many families place their faith in the surrogacy 
process despite its potential legal pitfalls due to lack of statutory regulation.   
 The term surrogacy usually refers to one of two methods: gestational and traditional.  
This is the method that the Rancic couple opted for and it usually creates a genetic link between 
the child and at least one intending parent contracting to have a surrogate carry their child.  As 
described previously, a woman’s egg is removed and combined with her partner’s sperm before 
                                                        
17
 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is A Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 349, 351-52. 
18
 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is A Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, at 351-52. 
19
 http://www.sharedconception.com/surrogate-mother-faq#q9 
20
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 419-20.   
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being implanted into a third person, the surrogate.
21
  If only one or no intending parent can 
supply gametes, then third party donors could be used to supply the needed gametes.
22
  This 
would also be considered gestational surrogacy.
23
  It may be referred to as donor surrogacy or as 
a third party gestational arrangement as well.
24
  In both such arrangements, the surrogate carries 
the child to full-term but has no genetic link to the child since her gametes were not used.
25
   
 Those that choose to can instead utilize the surrogate’s eggs. 26  This is called traditional  
 
or partial surrogacy and creates a genetic link between the child and the surrogate.
27
   
 
 According to the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”), gestational 
surrogacy is the method more frequently used today.
28
   However, the Council for Responsible 
Genetics claims that accurate statistics are not available to deduce how many more people have 
utilized this method rather than traditional surrogacy.
29
  Instead, the Council for Responsible 
Genetics found that studies that looked at IVF success rates demonstrate that the rate of 
gestational surrogacy has increased dramatically and will continue to do so over time.
30  The data 
from IVF success rates itself can be used to determine that gestational surrogacy arrangements 
have increased because in the gestational surrogacy process, the embryo of the intending parents 
                                                        
21
 Id. at 419-20.   
22
 Id.   
23
 Id. 
24
 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is A Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, at 351-52. 
25
 Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male 
Parent in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, at 203. 
26
 Id. at 203.   
27
 Id. 
28
 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has 
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61 DePaul L. Rev. 799, 809 
(2012).   
29
 http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf  
30
 Id. 
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is then implanted via IVF into the surrogate’s uterus.31  The CDC requires ART clinics, which 
perform IVF, to report the success rates of IVF cycles and to report when the patient is a 
gestational surrogate.
32
   
 The Council for Responsible Genetics is hesitant to conclude that gestational surrogacy is 
more prevalent than traditional surrogacy because the metric used to determine success rates of 
IVF is the IVF cycle.
33
  The measurement does not consider the individual, so there is no way to 
know how many women actually serve as surrogates because when an IVF procedure is not 
successful, it goes unreported.
34
  It is also hesitant to conclude that gestational surrogacy is more 
prevalent because no reliable statistics exist to account for how many people utilize the 
traditional method of surrogacy.
35
  As previously highlighted, the Council for Responsible 
Genetics did conclude that the rate utilization of gestational surrogacy has increased 
dramatically, doubling from 2004-2008.
36
  It was also comfortable in predicting that the rapid 
growth of gestational surrogacy was not likely to slow in the future.
37
 
B.  CURRENT CASE LAW AND THE POLICIES THAT INFLUENCED COURTS’ 
DECISIONS 
 Silence is the majority approach in regards to surrogacy.
38
  There are a few states that 
attempt to deal with the legal issues that arise in surrogacy via the court system and case law, and 
                                                        
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 421-22.   
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then, some states that provide legislative guidance in regards to surrogacy.
39
  There are two 
seminal surrogacy cases that are cited extensively: In Re Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert.   
 The traditional method of surrogacy was used by the Stern family in In re Baby M.
40
  In 
this case, the Sterns entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby Mr. Stern’s sperm was 
implanted into the surrogate.
41
  The Stern family opted to use the surrogate’s eggs due to Mrs. 
Stern’s fertility issues, although no court or legal commentary has expounded upon what those 
fertility issues were.
42
  Up until the child was born, the process had been successful for the 
Sterns. 
43
  Then, the surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, decided that she wanted to keep the child 
and the Sterns sued for parental rights.
44
  The New Jersey Supreme Court was left to decide who 
the child’s parents were as the state legislature provided no statutory guidance on the matter.45  
The court invalidated the surrogacy contract between the Sterns and the surrogate based on 
public policy implications that it felt stemmed from such agreements.
46
  The court reasoned that 
surrogacy agreements exploited lower income individuals, who would be inclined to use their 
bodies for money.
47
  The protectionist theory that the New Jersey Supreme Court incited in Baby 
M is the same theory that has influenced the ban on payments for organ donation.
48
  Ultimately, 
the court used the best interests of the child analysis to determine placement of the child.
49
  It 
                                                        
39
 Id. at 421-22.   
40
 In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (New Jersey 1988). 
41
 Id.   
42
 Id.  
43
 Id.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Id.  
46
 Id.  
47
 Id.  
48
 Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female 
Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 717, 729 (2003). 
49
 In the Matter of Baby M, 537 at 1227.   
  
 8 
reasoned that placing the child with the Sterns was the best outcome for the child.
50
  The court 
did find the surrogate to be the child’s legal mother, and thus, Mrs. Stern could not adopt Melissa 
until she became an adult.
51
 
 While protection from exploitation of lower income individuals was a guiding public 
policy concern for the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M, this is not the only theory that has 
been offered in response to the legal issues surrounding surrogacy.
52
  There is also the feminist 
approach, which advocates for the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, under the view that a 
woman should have autonomy of her body and the freedom to contract.
53
  
 A California court appeared to adopt a more feminist approach, considering the freedom 
to contract in its analysis of a surrogacy agreement in Johnson v. Calvert.
54
  In this case, the 
Calverts, seeking to start a family, used the gestational method of surrogacy.
55
  The court used an 
intent-based analysis.
56
  It reasoned that but-for the Calverts, who had the intent to bring the 
child into the world, the child would not exist and, therefore, they were the child’s legal 
parents.
57
   
 This case is clearly factually different than In Re Baby M, where the Sterns used the 
traditional method of surrogacy.  The facts in Johnson v. Calvert probably made it more 
palatable for the court to find the Calverts to be the child’s legal parents as they had a genetic 
link.  But the court was unequivocal in regards to the parties’ freedom to contract when it stated, 
                                                        
50
 Id.  
51
 Jennifer Weiss, Now it’s Melissa’s Time, 
http://www.reproductivelawyer.com/press_babym.cfm.    
52
 Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female 
Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, at 723.  
53
 Id. at 723.   
54
 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782. 
55
 Id.  
56
 Id.   
57
 Id. 
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“[T]he parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in vitro fertilization and related medical 
procedures before the child was conceived; at the time when Anna [the surrogate] entered into 
the contract, therefore, she was not vulnerable to financial inducements to part with her own 
expected offspring.”58  This part of the court’s analysis was less paternalistic than the approach 
the New Jersey Supreme took in Baby M, and thus, exemplified another policy that could shape a 
court’s decision in a surrogacy case.59 
 Another case that is illustrative of how a court may decide when presented with a 
surrogacy agreement gone awry is Belsito v. Clark.  In this case, the Clarks sought to start a 
family via the gestational surrogacy method.
60
  The court did not use the intent-based test of 
Johnson v. Calvert but instead looked to the genetic link of the parents to the child.
61
  The Ohio 
court limited the legal parents in a surrogacy agreement to those with a genetic link to the child.
62
  
Although the court’s decision made surrogacy contracts more predictable at the outset, it also 
expanded the amount of individuals that could not be deemed to be the legal parents of a child 
resulting from gestational surrogacy arrangements.   
C.  CURRENT STATUTORY REGULATION 
1.  States That Have Statutorily Banned Surrogacy 
 A few states and the federal district of Washington, D.C. have banned surrogacy 
agreements.
63
 In Washington, D.C. all surrogacy contracts are unenforceable and the entrance 
                                                        
58
 Id. 
59
 Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female 
Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, at 723. 
60
 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d at 762.   
61
 Id. at 762.   
62
 Id.  
63
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 421-22.   
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into such agreements may result in prison confinement, fines, or potentially both.
64
  New York 
has also banned all surrogacy agreements.
65
  In the state of New York, the heaviest penalties are 
for those who act as intermediaries, which could be anyone who tries to facilitate a surrogacy 
contract.
66
  Michigan also bans surrogacy agreements; its statutory scheme closely resembles 
New York’s approach.67  Finally, Arizona, Nebraska, and Louisiana have also statutorily banned 
surrogacy contracts.
68
 
2. States with Varied Statutory Approaches  
 While statutory regulation of surrogacy is the exception rather than the norm in the 
United States, a few states have attempted to provide guidance to those seeking to start a family 
via surrogacy.  Florida allows for gestational agreements but requires that the intending parents 
must be married.
69
  Several other states such as Virginia, Texas, and Nevada have similar 
statutory frameworks to Florida regarding gestational agreements.
70
  North Dakota bans 
traditional surrogacy contracts although it allows for gestational contracts.
71
  Finally, Illinois has 
some of the most comprehensive legislation regarding gestational surrogacy agreements.
72
 
 Illinois enacted its Gestational Surrogacy Act to standardize various aspects of a 
gestational surrogacy agreement. 
73
  Those seeking to a start a family through this method of 
                                                        
64
 Id. at 421-22.   
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id.  
68
 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has 
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, at 809.    
69
 Id. at 809.    
70
 Id. 
71
 Id.  
72
 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is A Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, at 373. 
73
 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has 
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, at 809.    
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surrogacy must be doing so out of medical necessity.
74
  What exactly the Illinois legislature 
meant by “medical need” is unclear but since the GSA has been viewed as a more liberal body of 
law, it is likely that this term is not meant to be very limiting.
75
  Illinois is not the only state to 
allow for surrogacy only in instances of medical necessity; states such as Florida and Virginia 
also use the ambiguous term as a requirement for enforceability of the contract.
76
  The GSA is 
limiting in that it requires that one intending parent supply reproductive cells to be implanted in 
the surrogate.
77
   
 There has been some criticism of Illinois’s approach, which provides guidance for only 
intending parents who can supply gametes.
78
  It is understandable that some individuals feel this 
is unfair, as the intending parents who use only donor gametes are not protected by Illinois’s 
GSA.    
 Another feature of the GSA is that it does have some paternalistic aspects because it 
attempts to protect the surrogate via certain eligibility requirements: 
 (a) A gestational surrogate shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of this Act 
if she has met the following requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy contract is 
executed  
  (1) she is at least 21 years of age;  
  (2) she has given birth to at least one child; 
  (3) she has completed a medical evaluation; 
  (4) she has completed a mental health evaluation; 
 
750 ILCS §47/20(a)(1)-(4).
79
  A surrogate must be, at a minimum, 21 years of age.  The statute 
also mandates health evaluations and requires that the surrogate have previously bore a child.
80
 
                                                        
74
 Id. at 809.   
75
 Id.   
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. at 810.   
78
 Id.   
79
 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2005). 
80
 Id. at 47/20(a)(1)-(4). 
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The GSA includes a clause that states that any payment to the surrogate must be placed in an 
escrow account before performance.
81
  Such regulations may assuage public policy concerns 
about a woman exploiting her body and are intended to ensure that a woman does not feel 
coerced into entering such a contract. 
D.  A MODEL ACT: ARTICLE 8 OF THE UNFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
 Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) is a model act, which demonstrates how 
states may regulate gestational surrogacy contracts.
82
  First, Article 8 requires judicial 
intervention from the beginning of the surrogacy process: 
 (a) If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, a court may issue an order validating 
 the gestational agreement and declaring that the intended parents will be the parents of a 
 child born during the term of the of the agreement. 
 (b) The court may issue an order under subsection (a) only on finding that:  
  (1) the residence requirements of Section 802 have been satisfied and the parties have 
  submitted to the jurisdiction of the court under the jurisdictional standards of this  
  [Act];  
  (2) medical evidence shows that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is 
  unable to do so without unreasonable risk to her physical or mental health or to the  
  unborn child;  
  (3) unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home 
  study of the intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of fitness  
  applicable to adoptive parents. 
 
Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2002).
83
  The agreement between intending parents and a 
surrogate will only be enforceable if certain requirements are met.
84
  The language of § 801 
allows only a man and woman to be intending parents and both must be privy to the gestational 
surrogacy contract.
85
  Section 803 also has a residency requirement, which is that the mother or 
                                                        
81
 Id. at 47/25(a)(4).    
82
 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has 
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, at 813.   
83
 Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2002).   
84
 Unif. Parentage Act § 801(b) (amended 2002).   
85
 Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2002).   
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intending parents of the child must have resided where the surrogacy agreement is to be declared 
valid for a minimum of 90 days.
86
  
  One of the highly criticized sections of Article 8 is the requirement of a home study, 
which is to be conducted by a child welfare agency, of the intended parents.
87
  Such criticism is 
misplaced because, first, the language of § 803 indicates that the court could waive such an 
investigation.
88
  Second, it is important that legislatures err on the side of comprehensive 
legislation that protects the best interests of children brought into this world via surrogacy 
despite any infringement that might have one’s right to procreate.  An example of why home 
study is necessary is In re: the Adoption of Infants H.; the case was about a man who was 57-
years-old when he approached an Indiana surrogacy agency to aid him in becoming a parent.
89
  
Not only were his age and single-person status reasons for concern, but his mental health status 
as well.    
III. A CALL FOR STATE LEGISLATURES TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO 
A. REGULATION OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS  
 As discussed previously, SART has concluded that gestational surrogacy is the more 
prevalent type of surrogacy, while the Council of Responsible genetics has concluded that the 
method of gestational surrogacy has seen rapid growth and has predicted that this trend is not 
likely to slow down.
90
  Since the trend demonstrates rapid growth in the utilization of gestational 
surrogacy, pragmatism would suggest that state legislatures should begin to regulate this method 
                                                        
86
 Unif. Parentage Act § 801(b) (amended 2002).   
87
 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has 
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, at 814-815.   
88
 Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2002).   
89
 Leora I. Gabryal, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need For a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, at 433-434. 
90
 http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf.   
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of surrogacy.
91
  Another reason gestational surrogacy should be regulated is that courts seem to 
grapple less with gestational surrogacy agreements than with traditional surrogacy agreements.
92
  
The genetic link that usually exists between at least one of the intending parents and the child is 
likely a predominating factor in why courts find it less daunting to determine parental rights in 
these cases.
93
   
 Despite the fact that courts do not seem to struggle as much with the legal outcomes in 
gestational surrogacy cases, comprehensive regulation is still necessary.  This is because it would 
be less of a burden on court systems and intending parents in states that do not have case law on 
point regarding legal outcomes of gestational surrogacy agreements.
94
  Statutory regulation that 
predicts the parental rights of the intending parties and gestational surrogate at the outset of a 
gestational surrogacy agreement could keep the court’s involvement relatively limited.  In fact, 
the Johnson court pleaded for the California legislature to do just that.
95
  
  From a humanistic standpoint, those seeking to start a family utilizing surrogacy likely 
have infertility issues or an alternative family unit and have endured enough emotional hardships 
as a result.  The predictability of parental rights stemming from surrogacy contracts will prevent 
more families from experiencing more emotional hardships such as being dragged through years 
of litigation to assume parental rights over a child. 
                                                        
91
 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is A Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, at 381. 
92
 Id. at 359-60. 
93
 Id. at 358. 
94
 Id. at 358-359.   
95
 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782.   
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 No stance is taken regarding the regulation of traditional surrogacy as other commentary 
has.
96
  A ban on traditional surrogacy would have serious implications for couples where both 
partners are infertile and those who cannot afford gestational surrogacy but wish to start a family.  
At this point, when such arrangements do not work out, it is important to note that the court 
system would be best apt to deal with the challenges presented by such scenarios.   
B. BALANCING THE INTEGRITY OF THE SURROGACY PROCESS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
 State legislatures may be wary of regulating surrogacy agreements due to the 
fundamental rights of the parties involved.
97
  In the Supreme Court case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
Justice Brennan stated, “[I]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or begat a child.”98  The 
infringement of one’s right to privacy and right to procreate is an argument that may be raised 
against statutory regulation of surrogacy.
99
 
 Regulations from both Illinois’s GSA and Article 8 of the UPA could potentially raise 
constitutional issues.  As touched upon earlier, Illinois’s GSA, which requires at least one of the 
intending parents to provide gametes for the surrogacy agreement to be declared valid, provides 
no statutory protection for those who cannot provide gametes.
100
  To deal with the countervailing 
                                                        
96
 Laura Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of 
Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 Cath. Law 241, 
252-254 (1999). 
97
 Laura Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of 
Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, at 252-254.   
98
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
99
 Laura Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of 
Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, at 254. 
100
 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2005).   
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issue of infringing on one’s right to procreate, the argument has been presented that in the 
situation where the intending parents cannot supply gametes, adoption, instead of procreation, is 
an available option.
101
   
 This argument is not convincing.  Intending parents that enter into an agreement with a 
gestational surrogate but utilizing donor gametes should be entitled to protection of state laws 
because the intending parents are simply partaking in a variation of gestational surrogacy.
102
  
Furthermore, courts should address the legal challenges that arise from surrogacy arrangements 
that are not gestational in nature instead of banning entire classes of people from protection of 
state laws.  
 The requirement of § 801 of the UPA may prevent some groups, whether those groups 
are non-married couples, homosexual couples, or individuals from entering surrogacy 
agreements depending on a state’s interpretation of the model provision.103  Section 801 states 
that “[t]he man and the woman who are the intended parents must both be the parties to the 
gestational agreement.”104  This provision is an amendment from the UPA’s provision proposed 
in 2000, which was that the intending parents needed to be married.
105
  While the amendment 
seems to eliminate the marriage requirement, the provision has been interpreted to mean that 
only a man and a woman can be intending parents privy to the gestational agreement.
106
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When perceived in this regard, the requirement is invasive and an infringement on an 
individual’s right to procreate.  It is important to maintain integrity in the surrogacy process with 
laws that are geared towards promoting a stable, healthy family unit and protecting the surrogate.  
It is not worthwhile to prevent individuals and non-married or homosexual couples from 
participating in surrogacy agreements as a means of maintaining integrity in the surrogacy 
process.   
 The argument has also been raised that a regulation such as a home study requirement, 
which is when a welfare agency would investigate the intending parents prior to approval of the 
surrogacy agreement, may also conflict with one’s right to procreate.107  Such an argument is 
most convincing in the situation where a committed, younger to middle aged, healthy couple 
wants to start a family but must endure the more invasive requirement of a home study 
investigation.   In this scenario, violations of the right of privacy and the right to procreate will 
likely occur.  Only an infertile couple, or perhaps a homosexual couple, must undergo approval 
by an outside agency before being able to procreate.  This critique seems well founded. Yet, this 
argument fails to consider the actual, disturbing cases that have occurred due to a lack of 
statutory safeguards such a UPA’s home study requirement. 
 As mentioned previously, In re: the Adoption of Infants H involved a 57-year-old man 
named Stephen Melinger, who wanted to become a father.
108
  He contacted a surrogacy agency 
in Indiana, which facilitated a surrogacy arrangement between he and a woman from South 
Carolina.
109
  The surrogate became pregnant with twin girls, which were born prematurely in 
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Indiana.
110
  Genetically, the twins were not Melinger’s, nor the surrogate’s; the contract was 
third party gestational surrogacy arrangement.
111
  Hospital staff contacted the state welfare 
agency due to the disturbing behavior that Melinger displayed when visiting the twins in the 
neonatal intensive care unit.
112
   Melinger brought his pet bird to the unit in one instance.
113
  In 
another, he came to the hospital with his clothes covered in bird feces.
114
 
 Melinger was supposed to adopt the twins after their birth but due to concerns of his 
mental health, the children were placed in foster care.
115
  Eventually, the twins were placed in his 
custody by a lower court in Indiana.
116
  Melinger returned to New Jersey with the children while 
Indiana’s welfare agency appealed the decision.117  In New Jersey, an onlooker reported 
Melinger because the children looked dirty and were dressed inappropriately for cold weather.
118
  
When the state welfare agency investigated, they found Melinger’s home to be unsanitary and to 
smell strongly of urine.
119
  The twins were removed from Melinger’s custody.120  Indiana’s 
appellate court nullified Melinger’s adoption of the twins and ordered that the adoption be 
redone.
121
  Around the same time, a New Jersey court held that its own welfare agency had not 
proved Melinger was found to be a harm to the girls and that they were to be returned to him.
122
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 In another disturbing case, Amy and Scott Kehoe also entered into a third party 
gestational arrangement.
123
  Since Mrs. Kehoe was infertile, she could not supply gametes to 
create a genetic link between herself and a potential child.
124
  The couple selected a third party 
donor female to provide eggs, and instead of using Mr. Kehoe’s gametes, chose a third party 
donor male to provide sperm.
125
  The arrangement went awry when the surrogate, Laschell 
Baker, learned that Mrs. Kehoe was treated for mental illness.
126
  It appears that Mrs. Kehoe 
suffered from psychotic disorder not otherwise specified (NOS).
127
  At this point, twins had been 
bore by Mrs. Baker.
128
  The surrogate, who already had four children with her husband, filed an 
order with a Michigan court seeking custody of the children.
129
  Despite the fact that Mrs. 
Kehoe’s psychiatrist testified that she would be a fit mother, the motion was granted.130   
 Today, the children reside with the Baker couple.
131
  The Kehoes had originally named 
the children Ethan and Bridget, but the Bakers decided to change their names to Peyton and 
Dani.
132
  As of 2009, when the story of the arrangement that deteriorated between the Kehoes 
and Mrs. Baker was published in the New York Times, the Baker couple did not yet have the 
money to legally change the names of the children.
133
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 Robinson v. Hollingsworth, another surrogacy case litigated in New Jersey, involved a 
gestational arrangement as well.
134
  Sean and Donald Hollingsworth, a married, homosexual 
couple, hoped to start a family.
135
  Eventually they were able to when Donald’s sister, Angelia 
Robinson, agreed to be a gestational surrogate for the couple.
136
  The arrangement was 
gestational because an anonymous donor’s egg and Sean’s sperm were used to create the embryo 
that was implanted into Ms. Robinson.
137
  Thus, Ms. Robinson had no genetic link to the twins 
she eventually bore.
138
  
 The childbirth was a traumatic process for Ms. Robinson, who had to have an emergency 
caesarean section, and almost died.
139
  Soon there after, Ms. Robinson sued for custody of the 
twins despite the fact that she had signed a contract prior to implantation that gave Donald 
Hollingsworth adoptive of rights of the children that she bore.
140
  As elicited from Baby M, 
surrogacy contracts like the one that the Hollingsworth couple and Ms. Robinson signed, are 
void in New Jersey due to public policy concerns.
141
  Therefore, the Superior Court of New 
Jersey voided the agreement and awarded parental rights to Sean Hollingsworth, who had a 
genetic link with the children, and Angelia Robinson, who had no genetic link to the children at 
all.
142
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 It appears that sometime after the children were born and the Hollingsworth couple took 
custody, tensions began to grow between Ms. Robinson and the couple.
143
  Ms. Robinson was 
apparently dependent upon her brother and lived with him while he helped her get a job.
144
  It 
was also apparent that she shared some anti-homosexual sentiments, which the court noted when 
doing its best interests of the child analysis to determine custody.
145
  The court found that the 
Hollingsworth couple provided a more stable home life for the children, and granted Mr. Sean 
Hollingsworth full custody.
146
  Despite Ms. Robinson’s lack of a genetic link to the children and 
her anti-gay views, she was still deemed the children’s legal mother and awarded visitation 
rights.
147
 
 The previous cases mentioned demonstrate potential variations of gestational surrogacy 
arrangements.  Stephen Melinger had a third party gestational arrangement with two donors, as 
did the Kehoes, while the Hollingsworth couple utilized a donor’s eggs and Sean 
Hollingsworth’s sperm.148  As stated previously, an intending parent or parents using the 
gestational surrogacy method should be deemed the legal parent or parents of the resulting child.  
Under such a regulation, Stephen Melinger would be deemed the legal parent of the twin girls, 
the Kehoes would be deemed the legal parents of the twins bore by Ms. Baker, and the 
Hollingsworth couple would be deemed the legal parents of the twins bore by Ms. Robinson.  
Yet, this regulation only allows a party to predict his or her legal rights and cannot alone ensure 
integrity of the surrogacy process.   
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 One mechanism state legislatures should adopt to promote the integrity of the surrogacy 
process is a home study requirement similar to § 803 of the UPA.
149
  As described previously, § 
803 contains a waiver clause whereby a court could waive a home study investigation.
150
  In 
order to decrease the invasiveness of the home study requirement, the waiver clause should be 
the norm instead of the exception.   In addition, states should adopt laws that protect the 
surrogate, which would also aid in maintaining integrity in the surrogacy process.  Illinois’s GSA 
includes comprehensive regulation to protect the gestational surrogate by requiring her to submit 
to physical and mental examinations, along with mandating that she is 21 years of age and has 
previously bore a child.
151
  If such requirements are not met, the gestational surrogacy agreement 
is unenforceable.
152
 
 In each of the presented cases, there appeared to be at least one somewhat unstable 
individual partaking in the surrogacy arrangement.  Although Amy Kehoe was the only one 
known to have documented mental illness, the facts of the other cases suggest that something 
was not copacetic regarding Mr. Melinger or Ms. Robinson.
153
  Mr. Melinger was an older, 
single man who wore clothing covered in bird feces and brought his pet bird to a neo-natal 
intensive care unit.
154
  Ms. Robinson appeared to be financially dependent upon her brother, 
Donald Hollingsworth.  It was also discovered that she harbored anti-gay sentiments despite the 
fact that she agreed to be a gestational surrogate for her brother and his husband.
155
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 In cases that seem somewhat suspect, perhaps where an elderly individual seeks to start a 
family, the benefits of the home study requirement, which would be to promote the integrity of 
the surrogacy process by ensuring that a healthy, stable environment exists for children, could 
outweigh the potential infringement on an individual’s right to procreate.  When used only in 
what seem to be exceptional cases, the proposed home study requirement may not prevent a 
situation like that which occurred between the Kehoes and Mrs. Baker, since the Kehoes may 
have seemed unexceptional until Mrs. Baker discovered that Mrs. Kehoe suffered from psychotic 
disorder not otherwise specified.  Despite this, it is necessary to maintain the balance between 
the welfare of a child and one’s right to procreate, and a home study requirement that is too 
invasive would shift that balance in a way that would infringe upon one’s right to procreate.   
 Regulations akin to those found in Illinois’s GSA, which set forth certain requirements 
the gestational surrogate must meet for a surrogacy contract to be enforceable, would also help to 
maintain the balance between providing a healthy, stable home environment and one’s right to 
procreate.  Such regulations would also protect the surrogate, which would further promote the 
integrity of the surrogacy process.  In the case of Robinson v. Hollingsworth, a mental 
examination might have revealed Ms. Robinson’s anti-gay predilections, which may have made 
the Hollingsworth couple reconsider entering into a surrogacy contract with her.   
 The requirement that a surrogate has previously bore a child is also an important 
legislative consideration.  This is because a woman who has not experienced pregnancy and 
childbirth may not be fully aware of the mental and emotional, even physical feelings that may 
arise in the childbearing process.  These requirements, if met, would render the contract between 
the intending parents and the gestational surrogate enforceable.   
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 The intending parents right to procreate would be infringed to the point that they could 
not necessarily contract with any gestational surrogate of their choice but such requirements 
could prevent potential litigation from a gestational surrogate who was mentally unstable or grew 
too attached to the child during the pregnancy and birth.  The absence of litigation over parental 
rights, which can sometimes extend many years beyond the birth of the child, would likely 
promote a healthy, stable home environment.
156
  An environment inundated with litigation 
regarding parental rights would not likely promote a healthy, stable environment for a child.  
Therefore, along with protecting the surrogate, this regulation would also strike a balance 
between promoting the child’s best interests and one’s right to procreate.   
IV. CONCLUSION  
 The breadth of commentary calling for state legislatures to regulate surrogacy contracts is 
seemingly vast.
157
  In particular, gestational surrogacy is one area that should be statutorily 
regulated, so that parties who enter into such agreements will be able to predict their legal rights 
at the outset of process.  Gestational surrogacy arrangements are extremely popular and their use 
will not likely decrease moving forward. 
158
  Courts have appeared to be more comfortable 
deciding the legal outcome of gestational surrogacy arrangements, especially where there is a 
genetic link between an intending parent and the child.
159
  In addition, Illinois’s Gestational 
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Surrogacy Act comprehensively regulates gestational surrogacy arrangements.
160
  The intending 
parent or parents, whether they used their own gametes or donor gametes, should be deemed the 
legal parents of the child resulting from the gestational surrogacy arrangement. 
 Besides regulating gestational surrogacy contracts so that parties may be certain of their 
legal rights, state legislatures should attempt to draft laws that would promote the integrity of the 
surrogacy process.  Legislatures should enact a home study requirement that would permit 
judicial and welfare agency intervention in the gestational surrogacy process.  It is recommended 
that this requirement be an exception rather than the norm and that it be waived in more cases 
than it is used.  It would be a safeguard for cases that seem suspect and allow for a balance 
between ensuring that a stable, healthy environment exists for a child and one’s constitutional 
right to procreate.   
 Another way to maintain integrity in the surrogacy process is by creating eligibility 
requirements for who can become a gestational surrogate.  Legislatures should require that the 
potential gestational surrogate submit to a physical and mental examination.  The gestational 
surrogate should be of at least twenty-one years of age and have previously bore a child for the 
gestational surrogacy contract to be enforceable.  Such regulations would protect the gestational 
surrogate, the intending parents, and of course, the child’s best interests.   
 In 1986, the world’s first known gestational surrogacy agreement came to fruition.161  A 
gestational surrogate gave birth to a child that was not genetically linked to her.
162
  Almost thirty 
years later, gestational surrogacy agreements remain relatively untouched by state legislatures.  It 
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is time for the law to recognize the existence of gestational surrogacy and to confront the 
prevailing issues stemming from gestational surrogacy agreements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
